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Executive Summary 
 
All businesses are expected to respect human rights, regardless of their industry, size, ownership 
structure, or operational context. To realize their responsibility, institutional investors must ensure 
appropriate policies and undertake careful human rights due diligence. This can be difficult even in the best 
of circumstances. Situations of armed conflict and occupation are not the best of circumstances. Focusing 
on the Norwegian Statens Pensjonsfund Utland (“SPU”), this Report examines what institutional investors 
need to do in order to meet their responsibility to respect human rights when investing in businesses that 
operate in occupied territories.  
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights articulate an expectation that 
businesses will avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts. Where they neither cause 
nor contribute to those impacts – as is generally the case for institutional investors – but are directly linked 
to adverse impacts through their operations, products, services, or business relationships, businesses are 
expected to use leverage to ensure respect for human rights. If leverage proves ineffective, and the 
impacts are severe, businesses need to consider terminating their relationships. A failure to exercise 
leverage, or to terminate a relationship where the leverage proves ineffective, can transform a business’s 
relationship with the human rights impact. Where it would normally only be directly linked to the harm, the 
failure to take appropriate action can mean the business is now contributing to the impact and owes 
reparations to those harmed by its activities.  
This Report starts by establishing the basis and the content of institutional investors’ responsibility to 
respect human rights before applying these standards to SPU’s investments in businesses operating in 
Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. While the report focuses on the factual situation 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the lessons are applicable to institutional investors operating in a 
host of occupied territories.  
Demonstrating how businesses should undertake human rights due diligence, the Report first considers 
the adverse impacts Palestinians experience as a result of the settlements. The Report highlights the 
impact of settlements on Palestinians’ rights to life, freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, housing, freedom of movement, education, water and sanitation, and non-
discrimination. It also considers communal harms and international crimes associated with the settlements. 
The Report then turns to SPU’s responsibility.  
The Report points to several significant findings for SPU. First, SPU is directly linked to a wide variety of 
adverse human rights impacts in the Occupied Palestinian Territories through its investments. Second, 
SPU is not employing a consistent approach in how it addresses the adverse impacts. Its does not target, 
as it should, all businesses operating in the West Bank for enhanced human rights due diligence, nor does 
it appear to exercise leverage or exclude businesses operating in the West Bank in a consistent manner. 
As a result, some businesses are excluded while others are not despite having similar impacts. Where it is 
not adequately exercising leverage, or where it has attempted to exercise leverage but has not seen 
adequate change over time, SPU may be contributing to adverse human rights impacts. In such 
circumstances, SPU owes reparations to the Palestinians harmed by its activities. Third, SPU has fallen 
behind other institutional investors in Europe, investing in businesses that others have already divested 
from because of the adverse impacts they cause or contribute to. 
To address concerns over its policies and processes, this report recommends NBIM and/or SPU: 
- Conduct human rights due diligence for all companies in its portfolio operating in occupied territories;  
- Transparently communicate the actions it takes in regards to these investments; 
- Quickly divest from companies that cannot, by their nature or due to the Israeli legal structure, meet 
their own human rights responsibility to respect; 
- Revise the Council on Ethics’ Guidelines for observation and exclusion of companies; 
- Systematically integrate the Council on Ethics with NBIM’s human rights due diligence processes; 
- Adopt remedial efforts for those instances where SPU is no longer simply linked to human rights 
impacts but is now contributing to those impacts. 
The Report concludes by recommending that the Government of Norway adopt clearer due diligence 
requirements for all its businesses. 
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1. Introduction 
This Report examines the human rights responsibilities of the Government Pension Fund - Global (Statens 
Pensjonsfond Utland – “SPU”) in regard to its investments in companies operating in the West Bank, 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (“OPT”). Under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(“UNGP”), to date the most authoritative statement on the responsibility of businesses towards human 
rights, businesses should respect human rights, meaning they should refrain from negatively impacting on 
human rights.
1
 These UNGP have been affirmed by and incorporated into the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which are state-
endorsed recommendations for businesses operating in or from OECD member states, including Norway.
2
 
SPU is the Norwegian state-owned pension fund. It is managed by Norges Bank Investment Management 
(“NBIM”) “on behalf of the Ministry of Finance, which owns the fund on behalf of the Norwegian people.”
3
 
The Ministry sets the fund’s investment strategy, but it is NBIM that oversees the fund’s investments.
4
 The 
Ministry has set ethical “Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion from the Fund,” which state that a 
company “may be put under observation or be excluded” from investment if it “contributes to or is 
responsible for … serious or systematic human rights violations … [and] serious violations of the rights of 
individuals in situations of war or conflict.”
5
 To ensure SPU is abiding by these standards, the Ministry 
appoints a five-person Council on Ethics, which monitors the portfolio and investigates companies to 
determine whether the company should be observed or excluded.
6
 This Report considers the extent to 
which SPU, and those entities responsible for its management and ethical oversight, are meeting the 
standards recognised in the UNGP.  
To ensure respect for human rights, businesses should undertake human rights due diligence (“HRDD”) to 
identify the risks their operations pose towards the realization of human rights.
7
 This responsibility is 
incumbent upon all businesses – broadly defined – regardless of their size or industry, including 
institutional investors like SPU.
8
 Situations of occupation, however, are governed by a particular set of 
international laws, the international law of occupation, which in turns derives its legal content from 
international humanitarian law (“IHL”) (sometimes referred to as the laws of armed conflict). When 
applicable, the law of occupation can alter or inform obligations under international human rights law 
(“IHRL”).
9
 As such, due diligence in regard to these situations needs to look different, and respond 
differently, than HRDD in other contexts.  
The West Bank, including East Jerusalem, is occupied territory.
10
 This is a legal determination, not a moral 
or political one. The definition of occupied territory dates to 1907: “[t]erritory is considered occupied when it 
Francesca Fazio, 2018. (See photo credits.) 
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is actually placed under the authority of [a] hostile army.”
11
 This definition is now recognised as binding in 
all situations of occupation.
12
 The legal standards set out in this Report are true for all occupied territories. 
As such, while the report focuses on the OPT, its application is not limited to the OPT. In addition to the 
OPT, this currently includes Western Sahara, Northern Cyprus, Syria’s Golan Heights, Eastern Ukraine, 
Crimea (Ukraine), South Ossetia (Georgia), Abkhazia (Georgia), and Transnistria (Moldova).  
The law of occupation is intentionally temporary.
13
 The occupying power is prohibited from annexing the 
occupied territory, and occupied lands must eventually be returned to the occupied power.
14
 The law of 
occupation is intended to ensure the situation eventually returns to that which existed before the 
occupation.
15
 That means the advice in this Report is temporally limited: its applicability ceases when Israel 
withdraws to the 1967 borders and no longer effectively controls the West Bank.
16
 
The focus on Israel and the OPT is justified by several factual realities. First, the Israeli occupation of 
Palestine is the longest-running situation of occupation, and has been described as “the most entrenched 
and institutionalized” and “possibly the most legalized such regime in world history.”
17
 Second, the long-
standing documentation of human rights abuses by international organizations, Palestinian and Israeli civil 
society organizations, and academics provide an opportunity for nuance in addressing the responsibility of 
businesses. The operation of these principles will be dependent factually on each occupying power’s 
compliance in the occupied territories with IHRL, the law of occupation, and IHL. 
 
Separating Law and Politics 
It is at times difficult to separate the law from politics in the context of Israel and Palestine. Any source of 
information on the OPT faces accusations of bias. We have therefore limited the sources we use. Where 
we can, we rely on information from UN agencies and international organizations, notably the World Bank, 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), independent experts for the United Nations (“UN”), and the 
European Parliament’s Directorate-General for External Policies. We additionally use information and 
analysis from academics and Norwegian institutions. Where supplemental information is needed, we 
favour documentation from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and three local non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”): Yesh Din, an Israeli human rights organization that brought a lawsuit over the use 
of quarries in the West Bank; and Al-Haq and B’Tselem, who are members of the International Federation 
for Human Rights (FIDH) and have a long and well-respected history of accurate documentation and legal 
analysis on situations in the OPT, including with regard to business and human rights. At times, we have 
also used factual documentation, but not political or legal conclusions, from WhoProfits, which provides the 
most comprehensive database available on businesses in the OPT.
18
  
This Report would have been aided by the comprehensive list on business involvement in the OPT that 
OHCHR was asked to prepare. That list has not been released to the public, yet.
19
 Institutional investors 
such as SPU should seek the release of this list so as to aid in and streamline their own HRDD processes. 
 
This Report  
The international community has unequivocally recognised all businesses as bearers of human rights 
responsibilities. This has been most authoritatively articulated in the UNGP, adopted by the UN Human 
Rights Council in 2011. The Norwegian government endorsed the UNGP and was one of the first to adopt 
a National Action Plan on business and human rights (October 2015).
20
 The Norwegian government has 
defined the UNGP as the “gold standard for responsible business conduct”.
21
  
This Report focuses on the responsibility of SPU as a business enterprise - one that undertakes 
commercial transactions for the purpose of increasing monetary value, whether for the benefit of individual 
beneficiaries or society as a whole. Sovereign Wealth Funds, like SPU, offer a peculiar case in that they 
are state organs,
22
 and as such are addressed under both UNGP Pillar II (the business Responsibility to 
Respect) and UNGP Pillar I (the State Duty to Protect).
23
 This Report focuses on the business 
responsibility to respect human rights with a view to identifying the HRDD requirements enshrined in the 
UNGP.  
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In addition to the responsibilities of the corporation, the Government of Norway is obliged to regulate 
businesses for the benefit and protection of human rights.
24
 The state’s duty to protect, rooted in IHRL and 
re-affirmed by the UNGP,
25
 is fundamental to the realization of all human rights, and requires states to 
identify and respond to risks to human rights posed by non-state actors.
26
 To fulfil its obligations, the 
Government of Norway should adopt clear regulation of institutional investors, including SPU, on the 
expected due diligence process. We address needed reforms to the due diligence process in Section 5, but 
we do not otherwise analyse the Norwegian government’s responsibilities.  
In considering the relationships within the OPT that SPU needs to be concerned with, the report 
concentrates on the impacts and responsibilities of foreign and Israeli businesses operating in “Area C”, 
the area exclusively controlled by Israel.
27
 Due to differing legal frameworks, Palestinian businesses and 
foreign businesses operating in Areas “A” and “B” in the West Bank raise different legal issues from those 
presented by non-Palestinian businesses operating in “Area C.”    
This Report begins by examining and explaining the human rights responsibilities of institutional investors. 
It then considers the human rights impacts of businesses operating in the settlements before assessing 
what SPU needs to do in order to better comply with its responsibility to respect. 
 
2. Human Rights Responsibilities of 
Institutional Investors  
The UNGP’s conceptualization of the business responsibility to respect human rights implies that all 
businesses – irrespective of their “size, sector, operational context, ownership and structure”
28
 – should 
avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with 
which they are involved.
29
 Such responsibility exists over and above legal compliance, and independently 
of a State’s ability and/or willingness to fulfil its own human rights obligations.
30
 Investors, like all 
businesses, are expected to respect human rights both through their own activities and through their 
business relationships.
31
 This means that their responsibility can arise not only from their own acts or 
omissions, but also from their more or less close association with the conduct of third-party entities – 
private or public – causing adverse human rights impacts. Corporate responsibility for third-party human 
rights abuses is described by the UNGP as “complicity”. This section clarifies the different types of 
involvement and their consequences as the paradigm against which SPU’s responsibility, arising from its 
business ties to companies operating in the OPT, must be assessed. 
 
2.1. Investor responsibility for human rights abuses: what it 
means to “cause”, “contribute”, or be “linked to” adverse 
human rights impacts 
The starting point for this analysis is the UNGP’s articulation of the business responsibility to respect 
human rights, requiring that business enterprises (a) avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights 
impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts when they occur; and (b) seek to prevent or 
Asita, 2018. (See photo credits.) 
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mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by 
their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.
32
 
The OHCHR Interpretive Guide
33
 further clarifies the underlying categorization of the types of corporate 
involvement in human rights abuses as follows: 
There are three basic ways in which an enterprise can be involved in an adverse impact on human 
rights: 
(a) It may cause the impact through its own activities;  
(b) It may contribute to the impact through its own activities—either directly or through 
some outside entity (Government, business or other);  
(c) It may neither cause nor contribute to the impact, but be involved because the impact is 
caused by an entity with which it has a business relationship and is linked to its own 
operations, products or services.   
This categorization is fully applicable to the financial sector.
34
 Below, the different types of involvement are 
examined with a view to identifying their implications for investors and their possible consequences. 
2.1.1. “Causing” 
An investor can cause an adverse human rights impact when “its activities (its actions or omissions) on 
their own ‘remove or reduce’ a person’s (or group of persons’) ability to enjoy a human right”.
35
 The event 
of an institutional investor directly causing human rights harm through its own activities is relatively unlikely, 
especially when, as is generally the case for SPU, it has a non-controlling minority shareholding 
relationship with the investee company.
36
 It is true that the investor, through its voting rights, retains the 
ability to influence the company’s board or “hold it to account”.
37
 However, SPU as a minority shareholder, 
even when entitled to a considerable percentage of voting rights,
38
 does not typically have operational 
control over the activities of the investee company or its management.
39
 As such, the relevant activity – the 
financial transaction – is unlikely to be sufficient per se to result in the adverse impact. It could, however, 
directly contribute to or be linked to violations committed by investees.  
2.1.2. “Contributing to” 
The UNGP embrace both a “legal” definition of complicity and a “non-legal” one.
40
 The legal concept of 
complicity indicates a “direct contribution” to the human rights abuses and is exemplified in the UNGP by 
reference to the international criminal law standard for aiding and abetting, i.e., “knowingly providing 
practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the commission” of the violation.
41
 
Under the UNGP, however, the meaning and limits of responsibility for contributing to human rights 
impacts are not fully explained and appear broader than the strict international criminal law definition of 
complicity. As clarified by the OHCHR, this type of involvement in adverse human rights impacts “implies 
an element of causality” that might arise when the investor’s actions 
influenced the investee in such a way to make the adverse impact 
more likely.
42
 It appears, therefore, that “contribute” should be broadly 
understood to be an action or omission that assists or helps bring 
about the underlying violation, or increases the likelihood of the 
event.
43
  
As explained in Section 3 of this Report, there is little doubt that 
companies operating in the OPT are often knowingly and directly 
contributing to violations of human rights. The OHCHR identified a list 
of activities carried out by private actors in the OPT specifying that it is 
“very difficult to imagine a scenario in which a company could engage in listed activities in a way that is 
consistent with the Guiding Principles and international law”.
44
 Those activities include, among others, the 
supply of equipment, materials and services facilitating the construction, expansion and maintenance of 
settlements and of the wall, the destruction of Palestinian housing and property, and the use of natural 
resources for business purposes, as well as practices restricting the freedom of movement of 
Palestinians.
45
 In some instances, companies operating in the OPT appear as defendants in lawsuits filed 
by victims of abuses who aim to hold them liable for their contribution to violations in the OPT.
46
  
“Contributing to” 
“Contribute” should be 
broadly understood to be an 
action or omission that 
assists or helps bring about 
the underlying violation, or 
increases the likelihood of the 
event. 
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But could an investor like SPU be directly contributing, through its investments, to the human rights 
violations caused or contributed to by one of its investees in the OPT? Yes, this is possible, as the relevant 
financial transaction needs not be a conditio sine qua non for the commission of the violation.
47
 The 
OHCHR, for instance, concludes that a bank’s financing to a client for an infrastructure project entailing 
clear risks of forced displacements could constitute “contribution” to a human rights violation, if adequate 
steps to mitigate the impact are not taken.
48
 It does not provide specific guidance as to the level of financial 
investment needed to reach such a threshold, limiting itself to noting that activities with only a “trivial or 
minor” effect on the client would probably not rise to the threshold of financial complicity.
49
 In spite of the 
inevitable degree of indeterminacy of the definition of “contribution” under the UNGP, two important 
observations can be made: 
(i) It is not possible to determine a priori whether a certain amount of financial investment will constitute 
contribution to a human rights violation, as this will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of 
not only the size of the investment, but also of other relevant contextual factors, including, arguably, the 
severity and the systematic
50
 nature of the violations.  
(ii) In general terms, nothing in the UNGP indicates that the clear 
recommendation to avoid contributing to adverse human rights 
impacts can be interpreted as being limited to only large-scale 
investments in companies that violate human rights.
51
 On the contrary, 
reading the provision in its own context,
52
 a more consistent 
interpretation appears to be that, especially when serious and 
systematic human rights abuses are involved, the relatively limited 
size of a financial investment does not automatically shield the 
investor from responsibility under the UNGP. This holds true 
independently of any possible finding of legal liability by a court of law. 
When a company contributes to a violation, it has a responsibility to take the necessary steps to cease or 
prevent its contribution, mitigate any remaining impact, and cooperate in the remediation of the harm.
53
 
This implies that, although the financial transactions of non-controlling minority shareholders may be too far 
removed from the violations carried out by their recipients to give rise to legal liability for the investor, the 
latter might still be required, under the UNGP, to immediately divest from the abusing entity.
54
 
2.1.3. “Directly Linked to” 
Besides the notion of “legal complicity” illustrated above, the UNGP embrace the concept of “non-legal” 
complicity, stemming from a type of involvement that does not constitute “direct contribution” to human 
rights abuses, but that nevertheless triggers responsibility.
55
 Such responsibility arises when the adverse 
human rights impact is directly linked to the company’s operations, products or services by its business 
relationship with another entity.
56
  
In the case of institutional investors, minority shareholding in corporate entities is by all means sufficient 
to give rise to a “business relationship” for the purpose of the UNGP and of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises. Both the UN
57
 and the OECD
58
 have authoritatively confirmed this interpretation. 
“Directly linked to” involvement in human rights abuses will typically be the most relevant to the activities of 
institutional investors like SPU.
59
 In this respect, it is important to stress that: 
- the investor bears responsibility regardless of the size of its investment in a given company. In 
other words, a minority shareholder should not consider itself absolved of any responsibility under 
the UNGP due to the relatively limited proportion of shares it owns;
60
 
- relevant business relationships reach beyond the first tier,
61
 for instance when an investor holds 
shares in Israeli banking institutions that finance companies involved in the construction and 
expansion of illegal settlements in the OPT
62
 (See, Section 3.4, below); 
- in a context like the OPT, where the exercise of leverage is unlikely to stop or mitigate the adverse 
human rights impacts caused or contributed to by certain investee companies, the investor must 
consider whether it can continue the relationship in light of the severity of the harm. As is 
discussed below (See Section 5), in the OPT divestment will often be the only option for the 
investor to discharge its responsibility under the UNGP. 
“Directly linked to” adverse human rights impacts carry their own peculiar implications for companies and 
investors. Under the UNGP, besides the requirement to avoid causing or directly contributing to human 
rights violations through its own acts and omissions, a business or investor must seek to prevent or 
A Difficult Standard 
It is not possible to determine 
a priori whether a certain 
amount of financial investment 
will constitute contribution to, 
or will simply be directly linked 
to, a human rights violation. 
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mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to it by its business relationships. This 
wording indicates that if and when an investor becomes aware of its direct link to actual or potential human 
rights abuses committed by one of its investees, it has a duty of conduct to try and prevent or mitigate 
those impacts.
63
 A failure to take steps in that direction while 
retaining the business link to the abusing entity results in the 
investor’s breach of its responsibility to respect human rights 
under the UNGP. This also implies that an investor holding 
shares in companies operating in a high-risk human rights 
environment is highly unlikely to fully discharge its duties under 
the UNGP without conducting a comprehensive process of 
HRDD for all its investee companies. 
  
Importantly, the OHCHR recognises that “there is a continuum 
between ‘contributing to’ and having a ‘direct link’ to an adverse 
human rights impact”: an investor that is aware of an ongoing 
human rights issue directly linked to its operations, products or 
services that “over time fails to take reasonable steps to seek to prevent or mitigate the impact (…) could 
eventually be seen to be facilitating the continuance of the situation and thus be in a situation of 
‘contributing’” to the violation.
64
 In practice, in a context of widespread and systematic abuses such as the 
OPT (see Section 3 below), where human rights violations are structurally linked to the core activities of 
certain businesses, in many instances the exercise of HRDD by the investor cannot be reasonably 
expected to end or mitigate the violations. In such contexts, the line between contribution and directly 
linked to abuses becomes thinner, and divestment might in fact be the only possible step for an investor to 
discharge its responsibility to respect human rights, even when we accept its involvement is, under the 
UNGP, one of “non-legal complicity”. If SPU cannot use leverage to effect change in its investees’ 
human rights impacts, any continued investment has the potential to move from a situation in 
which SPU is directly linked to violations to one in which SPU is contributing to those violations. 
That will entail a new set of obligations, including remedies and reparations for the Palestinians harmed by 
SPU’s failure to divest. 
 
2.2. Human Rights Due Diligence: The enhanced standard to 
be applied in the OPT 
As rightly pointed out by a representative of the Norwegian government, “since the endorsement of the UN 
Guiding Principles by the Human Rights Council in 2011, corporate HRDD has become the norm of 
expected conduct.”
65
 HRDD is the process through which companies must identify, prevent, mitigate, and 
account for how they address their adverse human rights impacts.
66
 It is by conducting due diligence that 
companies can avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts. HRDD is also the standard 
of conduct that companies must abide by in order to discharge their responsibility for human rights 
violations that they have not caused or contributed to, but are nevertheless linked to them by their business 
relationships. While all investors have a responsibility to carry out HRDD, the content of such processes 
will vary according to the severity of the human rights risks and based on factors like the investor’s size, 
sector, operational context, ownership and structure.
67
 The HRDD requirement entails a cyclical process 
allowing the investor to periodically re-assess the existence of complicity risks.
68
  
2.2.1. Prioritization 
As recognised by the main soft law instruments on business and human rights, it can be challenging for an 
investor with a highly diversified portfolio to carry out due diligence efforts for a high number of investee 
companies. This requires prioritization of due diligence actions, meaning that investors should “screen their 
portfolios to identify general areas” where the risk of adverse impacts is most significant “and use this 
information as a basis for more detailed investigation” on some investee companies.
69
 As discussed in 
Section 4, below, NBIM does this already to some extent, but we find that the process could be improved.  
Severity of identified human rights risks should be the “predominant factor” orienting due diligence actions 
and their prioritization.
70
 Other factors that will influence the type of actions to be taken will be the size of 
the investment and the leverage that the investor has over the investee. It must be stressed that the need 
to prioritise the most serious impacts does not allow the investor to circumscribe its due diligence efforts 
solely to those cases, overlooking other violations potentially linked to it by its shareholding relationships. 
A Continuum 
The United Nations’ Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human 
Rights recognises that there is a 
continuum between ‘directly linked 
to’ and ‘contributing to’ a human 
rights impact. Businesses move 
along that continuum if they are 
aware of their link to a violation and 
fail to take action. 
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This is all the more true when an institutional investor holds shares in companies operating in the OPT, 
given the heightened likelihood of being associated with business-related violations of international law.  
The UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights 
expressly points to enhanced due diligence requirements for 
companies operating in high-risk human rights contexts like the 
OPT.
71
 For this reason, all investments linked to business 
operations in the OPT should be subject to enhanced due 
diligence.
72
 The current set of Guidelines for Observation and 
Exclusion from the Fund “does not aim for an actual 
investigation of all companies in the portfolio with regard to every 
incident of human rights violation”, but targets only “the worst 
cases”.
73
 While it is in line with the UNGP to apply different 
degrees of due diligence to different cases, no company 
operating in the OPT should remain under the radar.
74
 In this 
respect, as discussed in Section 4 below, the focus of the Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion of 
companies from SPU on “serious violations” might be problematic, unless it is complemented by HRDD 
processes targeting all companies in the portfolio with ties to the OPT.   
2.2.2. Public perception matters: The need for external accountability 
A company’s direct link to human rights abuses is sometimes defined in the UNGP and accompanying 
documents as “perceived” complicity,
75
 meaning that “the courts of public opinion”
76
 might perceive as 
complicity an investor’s association to human rights abuses to which it has not directly contributed. 
“Accountability” requires communicating externally “how adverse impacts are addressed”,
77
 especially 
when an investor’s “operating contexts pose risks of severe human 
rights impacts”.
78
 In the case of SPU and its ties to companies 
operating in the OPT, this would entail enhanced transparency on 
how and why certain companies are considered for observations or 
exclusion while others, sometimes operating in the same industry and 
context, are not. Part of the task would consist in providing a more 
precise definition of what is meant in the Council on Ethics’ 
Guidelines by “serious” violations of human rights. By means of 
example, it should be clarified on what basis the provision of landline 
services to Israeli settlements in Area C (see Partner 
Communications in the Annex), or holding land in the OPT for 
industrial purposes (see Jerusalem Economy in the Annex) are not 
perceived by SPU as breaches requiring at least observation. 
Accountability also compels disclosing which due diligence steps, if 
any, are taken towards specific investee companies that are not 
deemed by the Council on Ethics as being associated to the “worst 
cases” of human rights risks, and therefore not recommended for 
observation or exclusion, but that, nonetheless, pose legitimate 
concerns to the public opinion.
79
 This is arguably a strict requirement 
when investing in companies that operate in occupied territories 
characterised by widespread human rights violations.  
2.2.3. From Leverage to Divestment  
HRDD requires an investor to make use of its leverage to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights 
impacts linked to it by a shareholding relationship.
80
 This requires exercising its ability to influence the 
conduct of the investee company and may require taking steps to increase that leverage.
81
 In fact, lack of 
leverage over an investee does not relieve the investor from its responsibility to respect human rights.
82
 
Large Sovereign Wealth Funds like SPU, even as minority shareholders, typically “have the power to 
influence the behaviour of investee companies”.
83
 One way for a minority shareholder to increase its 
leverage on human rights matters could be, for instance, to collaborate with other investors to exert 
influence over the company.
84
 Some of the strategies recommended by the OECD to investors as to how 
to exert leverage
85
 entail activities that seem to be already part of NBIM’s “active ownership” practices.
86
 
These include, for instance, exercising voting rights to influence companies or hold them to account, 
attendance at general meetings and direct engagement with investees, with a “focus on the companies 
where the fund has its largest investments by market value, and on companies that operate in particularly 
high-risk sectors”.
87
 It is not clear, however, whether and to what extent these actions are also undertaken 
Enhanced Due Diligence 
Due to the severity of the violations 
in the OPT, and the potential for 
any business in the OPT to be 
implicated in those violations, all 
investments linked to business 
operations in the OPT should be 
subject to enhanced due diligence. 
Hebron. Francesca Fazio, 2018. 
(See photo credits.) 
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as part of a systematic HRDD process targeting all investee companies whose operations might raise 
(more or less severe) issues of complicity in human rights abuses (see Section 4 below). 
It should be stressed that divesting from a company should 
normally be considered the last resort option,
88
 in that a 
successful exercise of leverage, capable of effecting change 
in the conduct of an investee, could allow the investor to 
retain a business relationship that had raised complicity 
concerns, and generate a positive human rights impact.
89
 
Importantly, under the UNGP, divestment might be the 
required solution not only in cases of direct contribution 
to the abuse, but also when the company or investor has 
a direct link to the violation through its business 
relationships.
90
 Before deciding to withdraw, the investor 
should consider the possible adverse human rights impacts 
of the decision.
91
 However, attempts to influence the conduct 
of an investee cannot be protracted indefinitely without seeing progress. The UNGP clarify that “the more 
severe the abuse, the more quickly the enterprise will need to see change” before it decides to end the 
relationship.
92
 In this respect, the ethics assessment process carried out through the Council on Ethics, 
which has so far focused on a limited number of investees and which might entail several years of 
observation, is not sufficient, per se, to discharge NBIM’s due diligence requirements, especially in regard 
to companies operating in high-risk human rights contexts. As long as it retains the investment relationship, 
NBIM “should be able to demonstrate its own ongoing efforts to mitigate the impact,” ensuring external 
accountability.
93
  
Investors should consider that the OPT represents a context in which involvement in international law 
violations is, as warned by the OHCHR, almost a structural condition for some businesses.
94
 As such, 
divestment from some companies might be an inevitable decision to ensure compliance with international 
standards and avoid complicity. PGGM, for instance, has divested from a number of Israeli banks precisely 
because it recognised the virtual impossibility for those banks to end their involvement in the financing of 
illegal settlements.
95
 Those banks, however, remain present in SPU’s portfolio. 
 
 
3. The Human Rights Impact of Settlement 
Business Activities  
There are now 230 settlements in the West Bank, with 400,000 residents, developed with Israeli 
government incentives or interventions.
96
 These settlements are illegal under international law.
97
 Both the 
UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice have confirmed this.
98
 These settlements have 
also impacted negatively on the human rights of Palestinians in a myriad of ways. The conditions in the 
West Bank – and the impact of the settlements – are well-documented elsewhere,
99
 but to understand the 
link between the businesses in which SPU invests and the human rights violations, it is necessary to start 
with understanding the impact of the settlements and businesses engaged in the settlements. By beginning 
The Wall. Author unnamed, 2017. (See photo credits.) 
When Divesting Becomes 
Necessary 
Divesting from a company or situation 
is normally an option of last resort. If 
the investor can use its leverage to 
effect change in the investee 
company’s conduct, divesting may not 
be necessary. Where that becomes 
impossible, however, divestment is no 
longer an option but a responsibility. 
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with the experiences of the Palestinians and working backwards to address questions of responsibility, 
each individual business’s responsibility becomes clearer. This is also in line with the expectations of 
HRDD, which requires putting the rights-holders at the centre of the process and delineating responsibility 
based on the types of harms they experience, the severity of those harms, and the actions that cause, 
contribute, or are linked to any negative impacts on human rights.  
In this Report, we follow the standards outlined in the UNGP, relying on the human rights identified in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
100
 Because we do not address 
labour rights issues, we do not consider the ILO’s core labour standards, which would normally be 
considered under the UNGP.
101
 This section cannot delineate all the impacts of each company and 
therefore focuses on a limited number of widespread and systematic violations of IHRL, IHL, and the law of 
occupation that are felt by Palestinians, individually and collectively, as a result of the settlements. It is 
SPU’s responsibility to ensure complete HRDD for each business it invests in that operates in the OPT 
(See, Section 2.2.1). 
When examining the responsibility of businesses in situations of occupation, it is necessary to consider not 
only the content of IHRL but also of IHL and the law of occupation.
102
 As the International Court of Justice 
has explained (in a case focused on the occupation of Palestine), IHRL applies at all times, including in 
periods of armed conflict or occupation.
103
 But, where a more specialised regime of international law exists 
– such as IHL or the law of occupation – then the rules of those regimes can define the content and 
limitations of IHRL.
104
 In the analysis below, we highlight how these interactions work in practice, building 
on extensive literature on the application of human rights in situations of occupation.
105
  
 
3.1. Individual Violations  
Israeli settlements are only open to Jewish Israelis.
106
 Palestinians are prohibited from living there.
107
 This 
is a form of discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity.
108
 The settlements are sometimes planned by 
the Israeli government,
109
 a clear breach of IHL, the law of occupation, and international criminal law.
110
 
Other times, the settlements develop by individual Israelis deciding to move to an area, with the 
government providing protection to this unauthorised move.
111
 According to the World Bank, 68% of Area 
C is dedicated to Israeli settlements, 21% is closed for military purposes, and 9% for nature reserves.
112
 
This leaves only 2% of the land in Area C available for Palestinian use, housing 180,000 to 300,000 
Palestinians.   
The land taken for settlements is Palestinian land, either 
personal property or state-owned property. Where private 
land has been taken, the Israeli Attorney General has stated 
that Israeli law allows for the legalization of Israeli 
construction on that land.
113
 The taking of Palestinian 
property for the purpose of civilian settlement is a violation of 
IHL, the law of occupation, and international criminal law.
114
 
Taking private property in breach of the more specialised 
regimes of the law of occupation or international criminal law 
constitutes a breach of the human right to property as 
recognised in the UDHR.
115
  
The government’s protection of individual Israelis choosing to move to occupied territory without prior 
permission – and the government’s failure to stop the move in the first place – stands in stark contrast to 
the experience of Palestinians who are, as a matter of international law, entitled to live in Area C. 
Palestinians are routinely denied planning permission and when they undertake necessary renovations 
without planning permission they risk eviction, and with the Israeli government routinely destroying 
Palestinian homes.
116
 In 2016, 123 housing units were destroyed in East Jerusalem alone;
117
 1,093 were 
destroyed across the entirety of the West Bank.
118
 Another 15,000 homes – with 100,000 Palestinian 
residents – were “under threat of demolition,” according to the UN Special Rapporteur on Situation of 
Human Rights in the Palestinian Territory (“UN Special Rapporteur”).
119
 If these threats were carried out, it 
would displace one-third of the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem.
120
 The destruction of houses and 
the forced evictions of Palestinians because they have undertaken renovations necessary to secure the 
habitability of their homes breaches the right to housing;
121
 the discriminatory treatment of Israelis and 
Palestinians on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, and race breaches the right to non-discrimination.
122
 
Palestinian Housing Crisis, 2016: 
- 123 Housing Units destroyed in East 
Jerusalem 
 
- 1,093 houses destroyed across West 
Bank 
 
- 15,000 homes (with 100,000 
Palestinian residents) under threat of 
demolition. 
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The settlements are also given permits to expand their 
territory.
123
 In 2017, the Government of Israel announced 
“roughly 6,000 new settlement units in the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem,” with several of those units in new 
settlement blocs.
124
 The treatment of the settlements stands 
in contrast to the planning permission routinely denied to 
Palestinians. According to the latest report by the UN 
Special Rapporteur “only 8% of all building permits being 
issued by the Jerusalem municipality are granted for 
Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, despite the 
fact that the population density in Palestinian 
neighbourhoods is twice that of Israeli neighbourhoods.”
125
 
The cramped conditions in the Palestinian neighbourhoods 
suggest the housing provision is inadequate, indicating a 
breach of the state’s obligations towards the right to 
housing.
126
 Since this is done on a discriminatory basis, it is 
also a breach of the right to non-discrimination.
127
 Once 
again, where construction occurs without prior permission, 
Israel often demolishes the homes of Palestinians but not of 
Israelis in the settlements.
128
 Again, such measures breach 
the rights to housing and non-discrimination.
129
 
The limitation on planning permission is not restricted to 
housing; Palestinian communities are also restricted in 
building schools, which are demolished if they are built 
without necessary permission that, again, is virtually 
impossible to get.
130
 This renders education for these Palestinian communities unavailable and 
inaccessible, breaching the right to education.
131
 As it is done on a discriminatory basis, it also breaches 
the right to non-discrimination.
132
 
Palestinians are often subjected to temporary or permanent roadblocks or checkpoints, which alters their 
ability to travel to particular cities or restricts the manner in which they can travel.
133
 According to the UN, 
“[p]articularly severe restrictions are imposed on the movement of Palestinians who live in close proximity 
to Israeli settlers.”
134
 In Hebron alone, 6,000 Palestinians are subjected to “approximately 95 physical 
obstacles, including 19 permanently staffed checkpoints” that restrict the movements of cars and buses, 
and sometimes even pedestrian movements.
135
 The roadblocks as well as checkpoints limit the ability of 
West Bank residents to access medical care, particularly medical care that is only available to them in East 
Jerusalem or elsewhere.
136
 As the UN has explained, “[m]ost Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza 
requiring health care in East Jerusalem, Israel or abroad must apply for an Israeli-issued permit. … 15-30 
per cent of the applications are delayed or never approved, and the application process is reportedly slow 
and complicated.”
137
 Each of these acts constitutes a violation of the right to free movement because the 
regulation is carried out on a discriminatory basis;
138
 where the impact is on the availability and 
accessibility of healthcare, the checkpoints also breach the right to health.
139
   
The restrictions on the freedom of movement are also 
known to impact on the right to education. The restrictions 
prevent the Palestinian Ministry of Education from 
delivering textbooks, supplies, and furniture to some 
schools.
140
 Checkpoints and roadblocks are one of the 
reasons that many schoolchildren in remote areas ‘must 
walk 7-10 km to reach school.”
141
 In 2015, the UN surveyed 
33 communities and found that “almost one in five students 
in the West Bank must pass a checkpoint to reach 
school.”
142
 At the checkpoints, students and teachers report 
being subjected to routine harassment, by Israeli 
soldiers.
143
 From 1 November 2015 to 31 October 2015, 
“the United Nations Children’s Fund documented 247 cases 
of attacks on education, including physical assault, 
detention and checkpoint harassment and delays, affecting 
32,055 children.”
144
 While Israel is allowed to construct 
Demolished home in Umm al-Kher. Photo by 
Fadi Arouri. (See photo credits.) 
Himza Checkpoint. Photo courtesy of Al-Haq.  
(See photo credits.) 
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military checkpoints where necessary for security purposes,
145
 the impact on the ability of Palestinian 
children to access education are severe and raise questions as to whether Israel is doing what it should to 
ensure accessible education on a non-discriminatory basis to Palestinians.
146
  
Once a settlement is established, security forces are known to use excessive force against Palestinians, 
ostensibly to protect the settlements.
147
 Violence in the West Bank is pervasive, and at times it becomes 
particularly alarming. Between 9 and 16 December 2018 – 7 days – the UN reported that over 400 
Palestinians were injured, 200 arrested, and 5 killed.
148
 In comparison, 3 Israelis were killed and 13 
injured.
149
 The UN does not indicate that any Israelis were arrested for their participation in the violence.
150
 
While some of these deaths likely comply with international law, the disproportionate impact raises serious 
questions about the use of force. Reports of excessive use of force are also common at checkpoints, 
roadblocks, and in the carrying out of other police or military operations in the West Bank.
151
 These reports 
indicate that the use of force by Israeli forces often breaches the prohibitions on extrajudicial killings and/or 
torture, cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
152
 The Government of Israel is under an 
obligation to ensure the effective investigation, and where appropriate prosecution and punishment, of 
those directly responsible or who aid and abet torture, extrajudicial killings, or other criminal violations of 
IHRL and IHL.
153
 Unfortunately, invesitgations and prosecutions are rare.
154
 In addition to a breach of the 
underlying violations, such failures constitute a breach of the right to an effective remedy.
155
 
Settlements, even unapproved outposts, enjoy access to water and sewage treatment, electricity, 
dedicated schools, and easy access to hospitals.
156
 Palestinian communities, particularly Bedouins, are 
routinely denied these services.
157
 Israel often says it is not capable of servicing these communities – 
despite the fact that the distance between the settlement and the community is sometimes simply a wide 
road – and that for these communities to have access to these provisions they must move to areas 
approved by Israel, often away from their lands.
158
 Palestinian efforts to secure electricity, water, and 
sanitation services are often blocked, as Israel rarely gives planning permission for these efforts in the 
West Bank.
159
 When Palestinians develop their own resources – for example, if a community uses solar 
panels to access electricity without permission from the Israeli government – then the Israeli government 
demolishes or confiscates the relevant infrastructure.
160
 The failure to provide adequate and appropriate 
water and sewage systems, electricity, schools, and accessible hospitals constitutes violations of the rights 
to an adequate standard of living, education, health, and water and sanitation. Because it occurs on a 
discriminatory basis, the denial of access to these services violates the right to non-discrimination.
161
 The 
effective displacement of Palestinians from their land and housing, with their transfer to other areas of 
Palestine represents a violation of the rights to housing and non-discrimination.
162
 Because this occurs in a 
situation of occupation, it is also an international crime.
163
 
Water use in the West Bank is particularly problematic. Exact figures are difficult to determine, but in 2012 
the UN estimated that collectively the settlements consume “approximately six times the [amount of] water 
used by Palestinians in the West Bank.”
164
 While Palestinians are supposed to have access to 138.5 MCM 
of water each year, they have been unable to draw that, and Palestinians routinely have to pay for tankers 
to bring them water.
165
 Since 1994, 
Palestinian “per capita water access has 
declined by more than 30 percent,” and 
Palestinians, on average, use only 60% of 
the minimum water consumption 
recommended by the World Health 
Organization.
166
 The discriminatory 
provision of water constitutes not only 
violations of the rights to water and non-
discrimination but also the rights to health 
and food.
167
  
Because of the essential quality of water, 
both the UN Human Rights Committee, 
the body responsible for overseeing 
compliance with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
168
 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have recognised 
that violations of the right to water can also constitute violations of the right to life.
169
 Yet, when 
Palestinians wish to build water lines or attach new branches to existing lines, they are often denied 
permits to do so.
170
 There is no evidence of Israeli settlements being denied such permits.
171
 If the 
Palestinians attempt to secure water by building water lines, these are destroyed.
172
 Because this occurs 
on a discriminatory basis, these acts constitute violations of the right to water, health, food, and life.
173
 
WHO 
minimum  
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Water restrictions have also limited the ability of Palestinians to irrigate farmland.
174
 Providing water on a 
non-discriminatory basis and allowing for the irrigation of the arable land in Area C not currently being used 
by settlements “would increase (…) production by USD 1.068 billion.”
175
 As such, the discriminatory 
provision of water also constitutes a violation of the right to work.
176
  
Finally, Palestinians have been subjected to violence by Israeli settlers.
177
 There is evidence that the Israeli 
forces do not intervene to stop settler violence and do not arrest settlers who engage in this violence.
178
 
The failure of the Government of Israel to exercise due diligence and stop settler violence may constitute a 
violation of the right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
Normally violence by settlers would not give rise to violations of the rights to life or freedom from torture as 
IHRL generally requires the involvement of a state-actor. However, the failure of Israel to carry out 
appropriate investigations, and where appropriate prosecute and punish, settlers for their ill-treatment can 
transform a private act of violence into a breach of the prohibition of these rights.
179
 Settler violence 
impacts on Palestinian access to a variety of other rights, including education and health.
180
 According to 
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (“OCHA”), access to education in 83 residential 
areas is affected by “settler violence.”
181
 The impact of settler violence on education and the discriminatory 
response by the Government of Israel in its refusal to stop such violence gives rise to violations of the 
rights to education and non-discrimination. Settler violence has also made it impossible for Palestinians to 
access some of their lands, which means they no longer farm or use the land, allowing the Israeli 
government to invoke land laws dating back to the Ottoman Empire to declare the land “state land.”
182
 This 
gives rise to immediate violations of the rights to property, adequate standard of living, work, and non-
discrimination. The Government of Israel has also determined that it can use such land for settlements,
183
 
starting anew the cycle of human rights violations. 
 
3.2. The Communal Harm Experienced by Palestinians 
In addition to individual violations, there are two communal harms that need to be addressed: the de facto 
annexation of Palestinian territory; and the deprivation of economic power that would allow for the 
protection of human rights and the progressive realization of economic, social, and cultural rights.  
3.2.1. Annexation 
Annexation of occupied territory is strictly prohibited as a matter of international law.
184
 The international 
community no longer accepts the transfer of property and sovereignty through force.
185
 Annexation not only 
breaches the law of occupation but it deprives the individual members of the community of their collective 
right to self-determination, which is a separate human rights violation.
186
 The UN Special Rapporteur’s 
most recent report has asserted that Israel is, de facto, annexing Palestinian territory through the 
expansion of settlements, the construction of the Wall, and the development of a rail line to serve the 
settlements in the West Bank.
187
 The conclusion is supported by the International Court of Justice, which 
found that the construction of the Wall “create[s] a ‘fait accompli’ on the ground that could well become 
permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be 
tantamount to de facto annexation.”
188
 While de facto annexation is not technically a legal term found within 
IHL or the law of occupation, the concerns raised are pertinent to businesses operating in the West Bank 
who are expected to account for not only their known violations but also those that they are likely to cause 
or contribute to in the future.
189
 Based on the UN Special Rapporteur’s findings, the very existence of the 
settlements themselves threaten human rights. Businesses should be aware that the construction of 
settlements, the Wall, and the rail line may harm the rights of Palestinians to self-determination. 
3.2.2. The Deprivation of Economic Power 
Finally, the realization of human rights requires economic provision. Whether it is the construction of 
appropriate prisons or the construction of adequate schools, the training of judges or the training of 
teachers, the realization of human rights requires money. According to the World Bank, the land in Area C 
is subject to “a multi-layered system of physical, institutional, and administrative impediment” that restricts 
Palestinian economic development within Area C.
190
 If the restrictions were lifted or eased, the World Bank 
estimated that “activity and production in Area C is likely to amount to some USD 3.4 billion – or 35 percent 
of Palestinian GDP in 2011.”
191
 This figure, according to the World Bank, is “very probably an 
underestimate.”
192
 The economic deprivation is problematic generally, but it also translates into depleted 
tax revenue for the Palestinian Authority (“PA”), causing further negative impacts on human rights. The 
preferences given to Israeli settlement activities, and denied to Palestinians in the West Bank, cause this 
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deprivation of economic power. Those businesses that benefit from, and contribute to, the inequality 
between Israeli settlements and Palestinians in the West Bank are, at a minimum, directly linked to the 
negative human rights impacts that arise from the deprivation of Palestinian economic power.  
 
3.3. International Crimes  
In addition to the IHRL concerns, the occupation makes it necessary to highlight some of the violations of 
IHL, the law of occupation and international criminal law. First, extrajudicial killing of Palestinians by Israeli 
forces, and the use of force by the Israeli military, by Israeli police, or by settlers with the acquiescence of 
the Israeli forces, are war crimes prosecutable under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(“Rome Statute”).
193
  Physical forms of violence are not the only war crimes, however. The establishment 
of settlements is strictly prohibited as a matter of international law and is recognised as a war crime in the 
Rome Statute.
194
 Israel has long defended the establishment of settlements on the grounds that it gives the 
State a military advantage.
195
 The drafters of the relevant treaties were aware that the establishment of 
settlements could be militarily advantageous for the Occupying Power; but chose to prohibit the transfer of 
civilian populations without exception.
196
 The principle of “military necessity” cannot be used to excuse this 
international criminal law violation.  
The taking of private property is strictly prohibited 
under IHL and international criminal law, unless it is 
necessary for military purposes or for the effective 
administration of the occupation.
197
 It cannot be 
done for the commercial, economic, religious, or 
personal benefit of the citizens of the Occupying 
Power.
198
 If property is needed for military purposes, 
it must be returned to the rightful owners, along with 
compensation, at the end of the conflict or when 
those purposes are over.
199
 The separate 
international crime of “pillage” arises when an 
Occupying Power takes and consumes the property 
of the occupied without consent and with the intent 
of “depriv[ing] the owner of the property and to 
appropriate it for private or personal use.”
200
 The 
Occupying Power is allowed to use public property 
in the occupied territories “without damaging or 
diminishing it, although the property might naturally 
deteriorate over time.”
201
 There is no minimum threshold for the crime of pillage; one need not appropriate 
a majority or significant share of the resources to be guilty of this crime.
202
 The transfer of natural 
resources from Palestinian control to a privately held company for the purpose of exploiting the resources 
for commercial gain, permanently depriving Palestinians of the use of those resources, likely constitutes 
the crime of pillage.  
Finally, we recognise that some consider the situation in Israel to be a form of “apartheid”, a specific 
international crime. In light of the other international crimes and systemic discrimination, we do not find that 
the issue of apartheid would alter our conclusions or recommendations.  
 
3.4. The Responsibility of Businesses SPU Invests in 
With the myriad of human rights impacts caused by the settlements, it is difficult to imagine how any 
business could operate in a West Bank settlement while meeting the responsibility to respect human rights. 
At a minimum, businesses will use water and other services that are denied to Palestinians on a 
discriminatory basis, and that Palestinians cannot access because they are reserved for and being used by 
the settlements, including the businesses. Still, there are particular businesses that the SPU currently 
invests in which specifically contribute to some of the violations discussed above.  
A settlement. Photo courtesy of Al-Haq.  
(See photo credits.) 
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3.4.1. Businesses that Sell Security Equipment to Occupying Forces 
Businesses that supply military or security technology to the Israeli military are contributing to, and may be 
criminally complicit in, extrajudicial killings and torture or cruel and inhuman treatment. While they are not 
causing the criminal conduct, they are knowingly supplying equipment that is being used to monitor 
Palestinians in a manner that facilitates the criminal conduct. Under international law, the knowledge that 
equipment will be used for criminal purposes is often sufficient for a finding of complicity.
203
 The fact that 
the equipment could also be used for non-criminal purposes is generally not an adequate defence.
204
 
Given the routine reports of excessive use of force, equipment that supports these operations is 
contributing to the violations of human rights. 
It appears that both Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Co (HPE), USA, and Motorola Solutions, USA, supply 
equipment that is routinely used by the Israeli military for the purpose of monitoring Palestinians. Again, 
this does not cause criminal breaches, but the use of the equipment in these circumstances does 
contribute to the breaches. In turn, by financially supporting such businesses through its shareholding 
relationship, SPU might be contributing to these breaches, and is, at the very least, directly linked to them.  
3.4.2. Businesses Contributing to Home Demolitions 
As noted above, the home demolitions are carried out against Palestinians on a discriminatory basis. This 
constitutes a breach of the rights to housing and non-discrimination. Several businesses provide 
equipment to the Israeli government that is used in home demolitions in the West Bank. Similar to those 
companies that sell security equipment to occupying forces, businesses that contribute equipment to home 
demolitions may not be causing the violation, but they are clearly contributing to it by providing equipment 
that they know will be used in this manner. While some companies can claim that they did not initially know 
their equipment would be used in this manner, the systematic nature of home demolitions in the West Bank 
suggests that businesses should have, at least, “constructive knowledge” of how their equipment will be 
used.
205
 This is enough for them to incur responsibility under the UNGP for contributing to breaches. 
Where this constructive knowledge becomes actual knowledge, their provision of equipment may constitute 
criminal complicity.  
It appears that SPU currently invests in Caterpillar (USA), 
which supplies equipment to the Israeli government that has 
been used in home demolition.
206
 It is clear that Caterpillar 
has actual knowledge of how its equipment is used as it was 
famously sued over the death of an American woman. 
Rachel Corrie was run over by a bulldozer in 2003 as she 
protested a home demolition in the Gaza Strip.
207
 Caterpillar 
appears to continue to sell bulldozing and other equipment 
to the Israeli government.
208
 The Council on Ethics’ 2006 
decision not to exclude Caterpillar based on the fact that the 
equipment sold “also had legitimate uses for the buyer (i.e. 
the Israeli Army)”
209
 exculpates the company in a way that 
the UNGP do not allow. While “dual use” equipment can be 
complicated, when a business actively knows that the 
equipment it is supplying is being used to commit human 
rights violations, the business cannot continue to supply that equipment with a simple hope that it will not 
be used again in this manner. Doing so would constitute “knowingly providing practical assistance” in the 
commission of the breaches, which, as explained in the UNGP and above, triggers the international 
criminal law standard for aiding and abetting.
210
 Given the severity of the issue, Caterpillar is expected, 
under the UNGP, to take action to ensure that Israel does not use its equipment in continuing human rights 
violations.
211
 There is no public information to suggest that this has occurred; instead, Caterpillar appears 
to continue to sell equipment to the Israeli military despite knowing its use. By failing to exclude Caterpillar, 
the Council on Ethics applied (and continues to apply) a standard that is inconsistent with the UNGP.  
3.4.3. The Responsibility of Quarrying Businesses 
SPU’s portfolio includes Heidelberg Cement, which is currently engaged in quarrying in the OPT. 
Quarrying in occupied territory without the permission of the occupied government breaches the law of 
occupation as it constitutes the war crime of pillage.
212
 These companies are causing the international 
crime of pillage through their operations. While not all war crimes constitute breaches of IHRL, pillage is an 
international crime specifically because it constitutes a form of theft – a deprivation of resources from those 
Council on Ethics: Caterpillar 
The Council on Ethics decided that the 
“dual use” nature of Caterpillar’s 
equipment meant divesting from the 
company was unnecessary.  
This is not in line with the UNGP. Dual-
use equipment can be complicated, but 
where a company knows its equipment 
is being used for serious human rights 
violations, it has a responsibility to take 
measures to mitigate the harm.   
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who rightfully own and control the property.
213
 The quarries may contribute to violations of the right to 
property rights, since their operation on private property can be “normalised” by the Israeli legal system.
214
 
The placement and operations of the quarries in the OPT also contribute to widespread and systematic 
breaches of the right to free movement, and are directly linked to violations of the rights to housing, 
property and water on a non-discriminatory basis. The location of quarries has led to settlement build-up 
around their operations, leading to closed roads. In the case of Heidelberg Cement’s Nahal Raba quarry, 
the border wall – which does not align with the border and therefore prevents Palestinians from free 
movement within the occupied territories – is being constructed in a way that ensures discriminatory 
access to the quarry areas. By generally encouraging the build-up of settlements, quarries are also directly 
linked to violations of the rights to housing and water.  
By continuing to invest in Heidelberg Cement without taking targeted steps to mitigate the impacts, SPU is 
directly linked to, and may be contributing to, the war crime of pillage and the ongoing and serious 
violations of Palestinians’ human rights. Given its continuing support of Heidelberg Cement, despite the 
long-term nature of these violations, SPU’s involvement may cross the threshold from directly linked to into 
contributing to the violation.  
3.4.4. Businesses Engaged in Financing and Constructing Settlements 
The construction of the settlements themselves involve the taking of property for purposes that are not 
militarily necessary, in breach of IHL, the law of occupation, and, as a result, the IHRL right to property. 
The construction of the settlements also causes or contributes to a myriad of other violations, including the 
rights to water, health, education, and free movement on a non-discriminatory basis. The SPU appears to 
invest in at least five Israeli banks that fund the construction of settlements: Bank Hapoalim, Bank Leumi, 
First International Bank of Israel, Israel Discount Bank, and Mizrahi Tefahot Bank. SPU also appears 
to invest in Cemex, a Mexican company, and Heidelberg Cement from Germany. In addition to 
Heidelberg Cement’s quarrying operations, these companies supply materials used for settlement 
construction.  
At a minimum, businesses that knowingly fund the construction of settlements, construct the settlements 
themselves, or provide equipment for the construction of the settlements contribute to the human rights 
impacts caused by that construction. In certain circumstances, the financing or direct construction of the 
settlements can be understood as causing the violations because these businesses’ conduct is essential to 
the construction, and therefore essential to the resulting violations.  
For the banks, their participation appears 
unavoidable. The Dutch pension fund service 
provider PGGM found that “[g]iven the day-to-day 
reality and domestic legal framework they operate 
in, the banks have limited to no possibilities to end 
their involvement in the financing of settlements in 
the occupied Palestinian territories.”
215
 As such, 
PGGM excluded five Israeli banks from investment 
– the same five banks SPU appears to have 
invested in.
216
 The banks may rely on the Israeli 
legal framework as a defence, but this cannot be 
used to excuse SPU’s responsibility for financially 
investing in these banks and therefore contributing 
to or, at the very least, being directly linked to the 
violations caused by the settlement development. 
Cemex relied on the permission given to it by Israel as evidence that its operations were complying with 
international and domestic law.
217
 This is an insufficient explanation. Companies cannot rely on the 
statement of the Israeli government or its judiciary to determine, without further investigation, that activities 
or operations in or supporting West Bank settlements comply with IHRL, IHL, and the law of occupation. In 
fact, it is common for states engaged in systematic IHRL violations to excuse or justify those violations. 
That is why independent HRDD by businesses is necessary generally, and enhanced HRDD is crucial for 
businesses operating in conflict-affected areas. 
Quarry in Hebron. Najeh Hashlamoun / 
Apaimages (See photo credits.)  
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3.4.5. The Responsibility of Businesses Engaged in Wall and Rail Construction 
The construction of the Palestinian border wall has been acknowledged by the International Court of 
Justice to breach international law.
218
 Both activities take public and private Palestinian property for 
purposes that are not militarily necessary. As such, the constructions cause breaches of the human rights 
to property and contribute (minimally) to a breach of the right to self-determination. It appears that SPU 
invests in two companies that undertake such activity. Alstom is helping to construct the rail while Cemex 
has provided cement for the construction of the wall. SPU is, therefore, undoubtedly directly linked to these 
violations.  
 
 
4. Understanding SPU’s Responsibility  
The situation in the OPT is such that any business operating in, in furtherance of, as a consequence of, or 
in association with a settlement is causing, contributing, or directly linked to serious violations of human 
rights, including the rights to life, freedom from torture and cruel treatment, water, health, and non-
discrimination. There is simply no way for a business to participate in the settlements and still respect 
human rights.  
 
4.1. Distinguishing Types of Involvement 
In many cases, SPU’s responsibility to respect human rights will only be discharged by divesting from 
companies that cause or contribute to the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and to the human rights 
violations that stem from the Government of Israel’s approach to the settlements.  
As explained in 3.4.3, above, quarrying businesses are committing the war crime of pillage. They therefore 
cause the human rights impacts associated with that crime because their action is directly responsible for 
the harm to the Palestinians. By investing in Heidelberg Cement (or any other non-Palestinian quarry 
business in the West Bank), SPU is providing direct financial support to these violations. This is true no 
matter how small the investment. In these circumstances, in addition to being directly linked to the 
violations, SPU is likely also contributing to them. This is because, as explained in Section 2.1.3, when an 
investor continues to be linked to abuses committed by one of its investees and fails to take the necessary 
steps to mitigate the negative impacts within a reasonable timeframe, it can eventually find itself in a 
situation of contributing to the underlying impacts. 
Photo by Fadi Arouri. (See photo credits.) 
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Businesses that sell security equipment, that provide financing, goods, materials, or services for the 
construction of the wall, the settlements, and Palestinian home demolitions each contribute to the violations 
caused by these activities. These businesses do not directly undertake the violations, but they do play a 
role in their realisation. While the Government of Israel may still conclude the violations without the input of 
these specific companies, their goods and services remain a necessary part of the violation.  
Businesses are directly linked to a violation when there is a clear 
connection between their operations, products, or services and the 
violation. This would likely be the standard for some of the many 
manufacturing companies located in the settlements. These 
companies do not necessarily take active steps or provide a 
particular form of support to a violation but their operations benefit 
from the violations and are used by Israel as a form of oppression 
that gives rise to all the other violations Palestinians experience. 
Where SPU is providing support to these companies, it is also 
directly linked to the violations because SPU’s activities put it in 
close proximity to the violations, creating a connection between 
SPU’s investment and the harm experienced by the Palestinians.  
SPU needs to divest from all companies that are causing or 
contributing to violations, as well as from those that are directly linked to violations when SPU’s exercise of 
HRDD proves to be ineffective. In many cases, due to the large-scale and irremediable character of the 
human rights impacts occurring in the OPT, divestment needs to happen urgently. Given the duration of 
the occupation, and the documented problems with the settlements, the time to move from mitigation to 
divestment and remediation has come. The questions then are: (1) why hasn’t SPU done this yet and (2) 
what does it need to do (and what should the Norwegian government do) so as to ensure SPU and NBIM 
meet their responsibilities in the future?  
 
4.2. The Ethical Processes for NBIM and SPU 
According to the Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion from the Government Pension Fund - Global, 
“Companies may be put under observation or be excluded if there is an unacceptable risk that the 
company contributes to or is responsible for: a) serious or systematic human rights violations, such as 
murder, torture, deprivation of liberty, forced labour and the worst forms of child labour; b) serious 
violations of the rights of individuals in situations of war or conflict; c) severe environmental damage […] 
and f) other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms.”
219
 
For such purposes, the Council on Ethics – composed of five members appointed by the Ministry of 
Finance and with expertise to perform its functions – is entrusted to continuously monitor and assess the 
Fund’s portfolio and to make recommendations to NBIM in cases where it deems that observation or 
exclusion is required. The Council has recognised the value of the UNGP, acknowledging that companies 
“should implement HRDD processes to gain an understanding of what rights they affect through their 
activities, and how these are affected. Companies are also required to take steps to counteract and 
prevent any negative consequences, and to monitor the effects of these measures.”
220
 
4.2.1. Observations and Exclusions 
The process for recommendations by the Council on Ethics for observations and exclusions is as follows: 
The Council on Ethics has indicated that it bases its assessment and recommendations of “what 
constitutes a violation of the human rights criterion on internationally recognised conventions and 
Monitoring 
• Council 
continously 
monitors the 
fund's 
portfolio  
Investigation  
• By its own 
initiative  
• At the request 
of the Bank 
Response 
• Company is 
given 
opportunity to 
present 
information 
and opinions 
Assessment 
• Assessment 
shall be 
conducted to 
determine if 
there are still 
grounds for 
exclusion 
Recomendations 
• Description of 
the grounds 
for exlusion is 
presented to 
the Bank 
Publication 
• Council 
publishes its 
considerations 
of exclusion 
Investing appropriately will 
often be impossible 
There is simply no way for a 
business to participate in the 
settlements and still respect 
human rights. As such, SPU’s 
responsibility to respect human 
rights can only be fulfilled by 
exerting leverage and seeing 
quick change in the investee’s 
conduct, or by divesting.    
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authoritative interpretations thereof.”
221
 It has also stated that it often uses sector studies to identify and 
investigate companies deemed to have a high risk of violating ethical norms. Through news reports and 
other ad-hoc reporting, the Council also receives information about individual companies that may warrant 
further investigation.
222
 The Council has on several occasions assessed companies accused of 
contributing to human rights violations, for example, in the areas of natural resource management, 
agriculture, food production and textiles manufacture.
223
 It has recognised that its work in the field of 
human rights is “challenging in terms of both selecting companies for investigation and assessing the 
extent of companies’ responsibility for their supply chains.”
224
  
After NBIM has received the recommendations of the Council on Ethics, it can make decisions on 
observations or exclusions. For such purposes, NBIM may consider different factors, such as: a) probability 
of future norm violations; b) severity and extent of the violations; c) connection between the norm violated 
and the company in which SPU invested; and d) whether the company is doing what can reasonably be 
expected to reduce risk of future norm violations within a reasonable time frame. Furthermore, before 
making a decision on exclusion, NBIM shall consider whether other measures, such as the exercise of 
ownership rights, may be more suited to reduce the risk of continued norm violations. 
4.2.2. Divestments 
NBIM has three broad bases for excluding companies: product-based exclusion; conduct-based exclusion; 
and risk-based divestments. Risk-based divestments are part of NBIM’s risk management strategy, which 
is a process primarily concerned with risks to the company. This differs conceptually from the notions of 
HRDD or “human rights risk” embraced by the UNGP, which are centred on protecting the rights of 
stakeholders, rather than on the risks for the company’s shareholders.
225
 In spite of this, the “sustainability” 
concerns injected into this risk-management process can also serve as an entry point for divestments 
based on human rights concerns.  
With product-based exclusions, NBIM singles out “companies which themselves, or through entities they 
control, manufacture weapons that violate fundamental humanitarian principles through their normal use, 
or sell weapons or military material to certain countries.”
226
 It also excludes companies that derive a certain 
level of their income from coal and coal-based production as well as tobacco products.
227
 In 2018, NBIM 
excluded 6 companies due to product-based concerns. Four companies produce nuclear weapons and two 
are involved in coal or coal-based production.
228
 
For the conduct-based exclusions, NBIM focuses on companies whose actions are “considered to 
constitute a particularly serious violation of ethical norms.”
229
 To determine whether divestment and 
exclusion is necessary, NBIM considers “the probability of future norm violations, the severity and extent of 
the violations, and the connection between the violation and the company the fund is invested in.”
230
 The 
Executive Board also considers whether the company is changing its policies and practices so as to 
prevent a reoccurrence of the norm violation.
231
 This led to 7 companies being excluded in 2018.
232
 
 
4.3. Critical aspects  
It is natural to ask why SPU has not put under observation or excluded companies whose activities clearly 
pose human rights concerns, and that have already been excluded from several other European funds – 
including KLP (Norway), Storebrand (Norway), Sampensjon (Denmark), FDC  (Luxembourg), and PGGM 
(Netherlands), among others - specifically because of activities in the OPT.
233
 Part of the answer lies in 
how SPU’s processes are structured. 
Although SPU’s commitment to act as a leading responsible investor is to be praised, some critical aspects 
in its policies and in the ethics assessment process could explain why problematic ties to companies in the 
OPT have not been accounted for, so far. The Council on Ethics’ narrow focus on serious and systematic 
abuses might lead to arbitrary and contradictory decisions, if not backed up by clear and consistently 
applied definitions. As acknowledged by the Council itself, “[a]ssessing the threshold for what constitutes 
serious and systematic human rights violations … represents a major challenge”.
234
 The Council has 
concluded that “a small number of human rights violations can be sufficient to exclude a company if those 
violations are extremely serious, while violations do not individually need to be that serious if they occur 
systematically”.
235
 As shown in this Report, some of the companies currently present in SPU’s portfolio are 
most likely contributing to violations that would squarely fall within this paradigm. Moreover, some of them 
are engaged in activities that SPU has, on other occasions, considered of sufficient concern to warrant 
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exclusion from its portfolio (see, Shikun & Binui Ltd., Africa Israel Investments and Danya Cebus, 
excluded for their involvement in construction of illegal settlements,
236
 or Elbit Systems Ltd, excluded for 
supplying surveillance systems to the separation Wall
237
). Although the Council has claimed that “previous 
exclusions mean that the Council more easily picks up on new, similar cases”,
238
 some problematic 
companies remain in the portfolio with insufficient evidence of HRDD being exercised by NBIM. 
It is worrying that companies present in SPU’s portfolio with links to violations in the OPT are not 
mentioned in NBIM’s latest reports, including its Responsible Investment Reports, among the ones that 
have been singled out for “active ownership” engagement and company dialogue.
239
 In fact, even 
assuming that the Council on Ethics did not consider those companies’ activities to be of sufficient concern 
to flag them for observation and exclusion, HRDD steps need to be taken for all companies within the 
portfolio that have ties to high-risk or conflict-affected areas, such as the OPT. Moreover, as this Report 
has detailed, those activities do raise issues under international law. As such, NBIM should be 
communicating externally the ongoing and targeted efforts to exert leverage, alone or collaboratively with 
others, in order to pressure investee companies to change their conduct. Lastly, if NBIM still deems that 
some of the investee companies operating in the OPT do not raise complicity issues, they should 
communicate externally the reasons for that conclusion and be accountable to the public for that 
assessment. 
While product- and conduct-based exclusions are important, and a strong start to addressing the UNGP, 
they are not the only relevant considerations. The UNGP recognise that there is a heightened risk of 
businesses causing or contributing to human rights in conflict-affected areas.
240
 As such, businesses 
should be engaged in enhanced HRDD in these areas. NBIM should undertake context-based enhanced 
HRDD for investees operating in the OPT and other situations of occupation. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that some of the companies operating in the OPT (see Section 3 above) 
could arguably be considered for divestment also on grounds of “governance and sustainability risks”, 
which is an additional basis for withdrawal detailed in NBIM’s annual Responsible Investment Reports.
241
 
Risk-based divestment, as explained above, is primarily concerned with risks to the investor (and not to 
human rights per se), and can be triggered when NBIM sees “elevated long-term risks”.
242
 This might 
happen when a company’s conduct or operations have “externalities for society” and undermine 
“sustainable economic development in the longer term,” for instance, based on their climate change effects 
or involvement in corruption.
243
 It could be argued that companies structurally linked to or contributing to 
large-scale human rights violations in the OPT also fall within this category of non-sustainable businesses 
and could be singled out for divestment even in the framework of the company risk-management process. 
This assessment would not depend on recommendations by the Council on Ethics. 
 
 
Photo by Iyad Tawil, Jerusalem. (See photo credits.)  
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5. Moving Forward Responsibly  
SPU is a leading global player committed to responsible investment that has the capacity to act as a 
standard-setting investor. By focusing on SPU’s ties to one of the most problematic human rights contexts, 
the OPT, this Report has highlighted areas of concern with SPU’s responsible investment and ethics 
assessment policies. In particular, it has been shown how some companies linked to international law 
violations in the OPT remain in SPU’s portfolio seemingly without having been addressees of adequate 
HRDD actions. The perceived inconsistencies in SPU’s conduct in this respect might derive from two main 
factors: (i) an incomplete understanding of the nature and implications of the “Responsibility to Respect” as 
articulated by international instruments such as the UNGP and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, and (ii) gaps in the internal mechanisms governing ethics assessment of investees and 
HRDD.  
Recognising SPU’s commitment to responsible investment and human rights, and being convinced that 
SPU should strengthen its capacity to lead by example at the global level, this section presents a set of 
recommendations aimed at bridging the chasm between SPU’s policies and practices and the relevant 
international standards. While some of the recommendations are specific to the high-risk human rights 
context represented by the OPT, some of the reforms proposed can reflect positively on the broader 
spectrum of SPU’s investments. Additionally, while some recommendations are specific to SPU, many are 
appropriate for all institutional investors with investments in the OPT. 
 
SPU should conduct HRDD for all companies in its portfolio 
that operate in the OPT, and communicate actions taken. 
- While prioritizing the most severe human rights risks for due diligence is in line with the UNGP, no 
investee company with ties to the OPT should remain under the radar. As all activities carried out in 
occupied territories raise, per se, concerns over complicity and contribution to human rights abuses, 
HRDD should address, to varying degrees, all investee companies operating in those contexts, 
exercising context-based enhanced due diligence. Under the UNGP, the Ministry of Finance is 
expected to ensure companies are engaged in such enhanced due diligence. NBIM should 
communicate externally the actions taken, in order to ensure accountability. 
 
- SPU must be aware that exercising leverage over investees to try and mitigate human rights impacts is 
a precise requirement under the UNGP. Additionally, SPU should take steps to increase its leverage, 
for instance, through collaboration with other shareholders (a good practice that SPU has sometimes 
adopted). A failure to take steps in that direction while retaining the business link to the abusing entity 
results in the investor’s breach of its responsibility to respect under the UNGP. 
 
- The exercise of leverage over an investee causing or contributing to human rights violations has a 
temporal limit that must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The more severe the human rights 
impact, the more quickly SPU needs to see change in the investee’s conduct before it decides to divest.  
 
Divestment is (often) needed immediately 
- In some instances, neither SPU nor the investee company will be able to exercise leverage in a manner 
that affects change. For example, it appears that Israeli banks cannot avoid financing settlement 
construction. In order to avoid being complicit in or contributing to human rights abuses caused by 
settlement construction, SPU must divest quickly. It cannot adopt a “wait and see” approach because 
there is nothing to be seen by waiting. The exercise itself would be futile and simply prolong the 
contribution.  
 
- Similarly, SPU needs to immediately divest from companies involved in war crimes, breaches of 
fundmaental norms of IHL and the law of occupation, and serious or repeated violations of IHRL. The 
conditions in the West Bank are such that companies involved in pillage and in the construction or 
financing of the settlements, the rail lines, or the “border wall” cannot operate in the West Bank without 
causing or contributing to, and often being legally complicit in, international crimes and serious 
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violations of IHRL and IHL. The same is true for those 
companies that provide goods and materials used by the 
Israeli occupying forces in the demolition of Palestinian 
homes, communities, or water sources, or by Israeli police 
and military forces to monitor or detain Palestinians on a 
discriminatory basis. The severity of these impacts requires 
immediate divestment. 
 
- The UNGP explain that when divesting, businesses should 
take care to ensure their conduct does not exacerbate the 
human rights concerns. In a recent report, Amnesty 
International noted that businesses often rely on this 
exception to explain their presence in the West Bank, 
arguing that they provide jobs to Palestinians.
244
 Amnesty 
International noted that the provision of jobs to Palestinians cannot be used to “offset” the variety of 
severe impacts Palestinians experience as a result of the settlements. We agree with this conclusion. 
While companies operating in the West Bank may need to consider ways to mitigate the harm 
experienced by Palestinian employees – for example, working to secure documents and permission for 
them to work within Israel proper, or paying severance pay – SPU’s divestment is unlikely to require any 
measures to limit the impact on Palestinians. Instead, SPU can and should divest immediately. 
 
The Council on Ethics’ Guidelines for observation and 
exclusion of companies from SPU should be revised 
- The policy on observation and exclusion presently rests on a definition of “serious” (or “serious and 
systematic”) human rights violations prone to arbitrary interpretations. The definition of “severity” should 
reflect that given by the UNGP, as the “scale, scope and irremediable character” of the human rights 
impact.
245
  
 
- Severity should be only one among several factors influencing the chosen pattern of HRDD.
246
 The 
UNGP define the flexible and adaptable notion of HRDD based on the consideration of multiple factors: 
the severity of the human rights risk, the investor’s ability to mitigate such risks through leverage, how 
crucial the business relationship is to the investor, as well as the possible adverse human rights impacts 
of divestment.  
 
- The choice to divest must be taken consistently with international standards. In particular, divestment as 
a potentially necessary solution cannot be arbitrarily circumscribed to clear-cut cases of contribution 
amounting to “legal” complicity in human rights violations. In line with the UNGP, divestment must be 
considered as an option also when human rights violations to which SPU has not directly contributed 
are linked to it by its investment relationships. In these cases, divestment will be the required step when 
efforts at mitigation of the human rights impacts have failed. 
 
- The criteria for observation and exclusion could benefit from specifically mentioning that companies will 
be excluded if they are involved in violations of IHL, the law of occupation, and serious IHRL violations.
 
This would increase the transparency and consistency of SPU’s approach to “conduct-based 
exclusions.”  
 
The work of the Council on Ethics must be more clearly and 
systematically integrated with NBIM’s HRDD processes  
- All investee companies operating in the OPT and similarly problematic contexts must be the addressees 
of HRDD steps. NBIM, as a business entity, has a distinct responsibility, under international standards, 
to carry out HRDD to discharge its responsibility to respect human rights. Such responsibility cannot be 
fully discharged by only delegating to the Ethics Council the assessment of a limited number of cases 
deemed to be of particular concern. The dialogue between NBIM and the Council should be 
systematised as an information-gathering process whereby all companies operating in high-risk 
SPU Cannot “Wait and See” 
The Israeli legal framework means 
that Israeli banks cannot avoid 
financing settlement construction. 
Quarries operating in the OPT are 
implicated in war crimes. Given the 
severity and systematic nature of 
these violations, SPU cannot “wait 
and see” with these investments 
because there is nothing to be seen 
by waiting. 
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contexts are screened. After a first screening, some must be flagged out for “company dialogue”, “active 
ownership”, or other types of engagement as might be necessary to address and mitigate complicity 
concerns. A more robust process of observation, potentially leading to exclusion, can be maintained for 
investees that present irreducible human rights concerns or have not adequately responded to HRDD 
action by the investor. 
 
SPU needs to adopt remedial efforts 
- Businesses that have caused or contributed to breaches of human rights have a responsibility to pay 
reparations to the victims.
247
 When considering adequate remedial processes and substantive 
reparations, SPU should consult with Palestinian NGOs and the local population. The nature of the 
occupation means that some remedial processes or forms of reparations normally recommended will be 
inappropriate for those who have been harmed by SPU’s practices. Consideration of alternatives is 
needed and, as with all reparations processes, should be guided by the needs of those harmed.  
 
The Government of Norway needs to Adopt Clearer Due 
Diligence Requirements  
- We have thus far focused on the responsibility of SPU and the businesses it invests in. We would be 
remiss, however, if we did not mention that the primary responsibility here rests with the State of 
Norway. The State must protect human rights. In the context of business and human rights, as the 
primary UN treaty bodies have recognised, that duty does not end with Norway’s borders.
248
 The State 
should adopt regulations to ensure businesses, including SPU, undertake HRDD throughout their 
supply chains and across their business relationships, and enhanced HRDD in conflict-affected 
areas.
249
 The connection between the state and SPU heightens the government’s responsibility in this 
area.
250
 As such, the Government must, expeditiously, adopt regulations outlining SPU’s HRDD 
obligations, and establishing expectations for remedial processes in situations where SPU has been 
slow to act and therefore contributed to human rights abuses. 
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1 The companies in grey are those present in the SPU’s portfolio. Parent companies indicated in the second column are not in the portfolio (unless otherwise specified). 
2 Investors: Le Fonds de compensation commun au régime général de pension (FDC) – Luxembourg; Kommunal Landspensjonskasse Gjensidig Forsikringsselskap 
(KLP) – Norway; Nordea Bank Abp (Nordea) – Finland; Stichting Pensioenfonds Zorg en Welzijn (PGGM) – The Netherlands; Storebrand – Norway; United Methodist 
Church – USA; Sampensjon – Denmark. 
Company Parent Company Involvement in OPT Divestments
Alstom (France) Publicly traded Construction of train in OPT. Storebrand (2016)
Ashtrom Properties Ltd  Ashtrom Group
involvement in the expansion of Israeli 
settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory 
and construction of houses
None
B Communications  Ltd
Internet Gold – Golden 
Lines
Builds and maintains telecommunication 
infrastructure throughout the West Bank and 
Syrian Golan.
None
Bank Hapoalim (Israel)
Controlled by Arison 
Holdings (20%)
Provides financing for construction projects in 
Israeli settlements in OPT.
FDC (2014) PGGM 
(2014) Storebrand 
(2015) United 
Methodist Church 
(2016) Sampensjon 
(2017)
Bank Leumi (Israel) Publicly traded 
Provides financing for the construction of 
housing projects in Israeli settlements.
FDC (2014) PGGM 
(2014) Storebrand 
(2015) United 
Methodist Church 
(2016) Sampensjon 
(2017)
Bezeq (Israel)
Publicly traded - B 
Communications holds 
26.34%. 
Builds and maintains telecommunication 
infrastructure throughout the West Bank and 
Golan.
KLP (2017) 
Sampensjon (2017)
Caterpillar (USA) Publicly traded 
Products used in demolition of Palestinian 
homes, schools, orchards, olive of war in Gaza; 
and as a crowd control weapon. 
Presbyterian Church of 
the USA (2014)
Cellcom Israel (Israel)
Discount Investment 
Corporation (controlled by 
the IDB Group)
Provides cellular, ISP, ILD, landline and 
network end point services to Israeli settlements 
in Area C.
None
Cemex (Mexico) Publicly Traded
Through subsidiary Readymix Industries, it has 
plants in various settlements and has provided 
concrete elements for the construction of a 
security wall in the occupied West Bank.
Nordea (2013) KLP 
(2015) Storebrand 
(2015) 
CNH Industrial (Netherlands) Exor (major shareholder) 
 Machinery used for the construction of 
settlements and related infrastructure, 
settlement industrial zones and the Separation 
Wall.
None
Delek Group (Israel) Publicly traded
Subsidiary Delek Israel Fuel has gas and 
service stations across OPT.
None
Delta Galil Industries Ltd Publicly traded
Branches in occupied East Jerusalem and in the 
occupied West Bank
None
Elco ltd Publicly traded Owns 53% of Electra None
Electra Ltd/Israel Public
Multiple construction, infrastructure and 
systems provision to the Israeli settlements and 
bodies in the occupied Palestinian territory. 
Electra Construction, has been involved in the 
construction of housing projects in settlements in 
the occupied West Bank 
None
Dexia Credit Local (Belgium)
Dexia Group Loans to local and regional settlement councils. None
Energix-Renewable Energies 
Ltd (Israel)
Publicly traded
Solar projects located in the occupied West 
Bank
None
First International Bank of 
Israel 
FIBI Holding Ltd
Provides financing for the construction of 
housing projects in Israeli settlements and 
mortgages to homebuyers in Israeli settlements
FDC (2014) PGGM 
(2014) United 
Methodist Church 
(2016)
Ford Motor (USA) Publicly traded
Ford vehicles are imported and distributed 
through Delek Motors. Vehicles are modified 
and used by Israel Military and police special 
unit. 
None
Formula Systems (Israel) Asseco Group
Subsidiaries involved in providing IT systems to 
the Israeli Army.
None
General Mills (USA) Publicly traded
On of its brand products is Shalgal, a Pillsbury 
bakery that is located in the Atarot industrial 
zone in the occupied West Bank.
None
Gilat Satellite Networks 
(Israel)
Publicly traded
Antennas of the company are installed in 
checkpoints across OPT and it has provided the 
Israel Army with satellite communications 
systems. 
None
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HeidelbergCement 
(Germany) 
Publicly traded
Owns plants that operate and extract materials 
in OPT, and supplies construction materials to 
construction projects in the settlements.
KLP (2015) Storebrand 
(2015) Sampensjon 
(2017)
Hewlett-Packard Enterprise 
Co (USA)
Publicly traded
Provides the Israeli Ministry of Defence and the 
Ministry of the Interior a system of surveillance 
and identification used in settlements and 
checkpoints.
The Quaker Friends 
Fiduciary Corporation 
(2012) Presbyterian 
Church of the USA 
(2014) Storebrand 
(2014 - Q3 2017)
Hyundai Heavy Industries 
(South Korea)
Hyundai Heavy Industries 
Group
Hyundai excavators, imported and distributed in 
Israel through Efco Equipment, have been used 
for house demolitions and construction works in  
settlements. 
None
Israel Discount Bank (Israel) Publicly traded
Provides financial accompaniment for 
construction projects in the occupied Palestinian 
territory.
FDC (2014) PGGM 
(2014) United 
Methodist Church 
(2016)
Jerusalem Economy (Israel) Publicly traded
Subsidiary Mivne Taasiyah holds land in OPT 
for industrial and storage purposes. 
None
MAN Group (UK)
MAN SE (owned by 
Volkswagen AG)
Supplies the chassis for the car that carries the 
the “Skunk” – a crowd control weapon. 
None
Manitou (France) Publicly traded
Its cranes have been used in the construction 
and maintenance of the separation wall in the 
occupied West Bank.
None
Matrix IT Ltd Publicly traded
One of it projects work out in two offices  in the 
occupied West Bank. Provides Israeli Army 
and Ministry of Defense with training on cyber 
security.
None
Mitsubishi Motors 
Corporation (Japan)
Publicly traded - Majority 
shareholder Nissan (34%) 
The Mitsubishi Pajero Model has been used by 
the Israeli Civil Administration for the 
distribution of demolition and confiscation orders 
in Area C in the occupied West Bank.
None
Mizrahi Tefahot Bank 
(Israel)
Publicly traded
Provides financial accompaniment for 
construction projects in the occupied Palestinian 
territory.
FDC (2014) PGGM 
(2014) Storebrand 
(2015) United 
Methodist Church 
(2016)
Motorola Solutions (USA) Publicly traded
Provides surveillance systems and radar 
detectors to Israeli settlements and checkpoints 
on the wall.
Presbyterian Church of 
the USA (2014) 
Storebrand (2015) 
Sampensjon (2018)
One Software Publicly traded
Subsidiaries have offices in the West Bank and 
provides computers and servers maintenance to 
the Israeli Army
None
Partner Communications 
(Israel)
Publicly traded - Majority 
shareholder Israel 
Telecom (30%)
provides cellular, ISP, ILD and landline services 
to Israeli settlements in Area C, and has active 
antennas and telecommunication infrastructure 
facilities on occupied land in the West Bank.
None
Paz Oil (Israel) Publicly traded
17 filling stations in the occupied Palestinian 
territory and Syrian Golan, in the occupied West 
Bank, and in occupied East Jerusalem.
None
Rami Levy Chain Stores 
Hashikma Marketing 2006 
Ltd
Publicly traded
Operates five supermarkets across the West 
Bank
None
Shapir Engineering and 
Industry Ltd
Publicly traded
Build housing projects and infrastructure in the 
West Bank
None
Shufersal (Israel)
Discount Investment 
Corporation
Operates branches in occupied settlements. None
Siemens (Germany) Publicly traded
Participating in the electrification of the Israeli 
Railways network.
None
Terex (USA) Publicly traded
Track excavators were used during demolitions 
in the Palestinian neighborhoods of At-Tur and 
Beit Hanina in East Jerusalem.
None
Teva Pharmaceutical 
Industries Ltd (Israel)
Publicly traded
Enjoys the advantages generated by the Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian lands allowing the 
company to exploit the Palestinian market, 
creating the so-called 'Captive Market'. 
None
Toyota Motor Corporation 
(Japan)
Publicly traded
Hilux model is being used by the Israeli army 
and border police to protect illegal settlements 
and military bases along the West Bank.
None
Volvo (Sweden)
Zhejiang Geely Holding 
Group
Heavy machinery has been used for the 
demolition of Palestinian houses in the occupied 
West Bank and East Jerusalem, construction of 
Israeli settlements and construction of the 
Separation Wall.
None
Company Parent Company Involvement in OPT Divestments
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